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Abstract—Traffic congestion threats the vitality of cities and 
the welfare of citizens. Transportation systems are using various 
technologies to allow users to adapt and have a different decision 
on transportation modes. Modification and improvement of 
these systems affect commuters’ perspective and social welfare. 
In this study, the effect of equilibrium road flow on commuters’ 
utilities with a different type of transportation mode will be 
discussed. A simple network with two modes of transportation 
will be illustrated to test the efficiency of minority game and 
reinforcement learning in commuters’ daily trip decision 
making based on time and mode. The artificial society of agents 
is simulated to analyze the results. 
Keywords—transportation system, minority game, 
reinforcement learning, multi-agent system, simulation 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Transport is an activity where something is moved 
between the source and destination by one or several modes 
of transport. There are five basic modes of transportation: 
road, rail, air, water and pipeline [1].  An excellent transport 
system is vital for a high quality of life, making places 
accessible and bringing people and goods together. 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) helps to 
achieve this high-level objective by enhancing Transportation 
systems with intelligent systems[2]. 
Among all type of transport, road transport has an 
important role in daily trips. People are migrated to cities 
because of the benefits of services and employment compared 
to rural areas. However, it is becoming harder to maintain road 
traffic in smooth working order. Traffic congestion is a sign 
of a city’s vitality and policy measures like punishments or 
rewards often fail to create a long term remedy. The rise of 
ICT enables the provision of travel information through 
advanced traveler information systems (ATIS). Current ATIS 
based on shortest path routing might expedite traffic to 
converge towards the suboptimal User Equilibrium (UE) 
state[3]. 
Traffic congestion is one of the reasons for negative 
externalities, such as air pollution, time losses, noise, and 
decreasing safety. As more people are attracted to cities, future 
traffic congestion levels are not only decreased but also 
increased and extending road capacity would not solve 
congestion problems. While private cars maximize personal 
mobility and comfort, various strategies have attempted to 
discourage car travel to use public transportation. 
To encourage commuters to shift from private car to public 
transport or intermodal changes, it is exigent to provide a 
competitive quality to public transport compared to its private 
counterpart. This can be measured in different aspects such as 
safety, comfort, information, and monetary cost, but more 
importantly, travel times compared to those of private cars[4]. 
Moreover, Policy measures in transportation planning aim 
at improving the system as a whole. Changes to the system 
that result in an unequal distribution of the overall welfare gain 
are, however, hard to implement in democratically organized 
societies [5]. Different categories of policies can be 
considered in urban road transportation: negative incentives 
[6], positive incentives or rewards[7, 8], sharing economy [3, 
9].  
In recent researches, positive policies were discussed as 
discount or money payback to commuters. Kokkinogenis et al. 
[12], discussed a social-oriented modeling and simulation 
framework for Artificial Transportation Systems, which 
accounts for different social dimensions of the system in the 
assessment and application of policy procedures. They 
illustrated how a social agent-based model can be a useful tool 
to test the appropriateness and efficiency of transportation 
policies[12]. 
Traditional transport planning tools are not able to provide 
welfare analysis. In order to bridge this gap, multi-agent 
microsimulations can be used. Large-scale multi-agent traffic 
simulations are capable of simulating the complete day-plans 
of several millions of individuals (agents) [10]. A realistic 
visualization of agent-based traffic modeling allows creating 
visually realistic reconstructions of modern or historical road 
traffic. Furthermore, the development of a complex interactive 
environment can bring scientists to new horizons in transport 
modeling by an interactive combination of a traffic simulation 
(change traffic conditions or create emergencies on the road) 
and visual analysis[11]. 
Klein et al. developed a multi-agent simulation model for 
the daily evolution of traffic on the road that the behavior of 
agents was reinforced by their previous experiences. They 
considered various network designs, information 
recommendations, and incentive mechanisms, and evaluated 
their models based on efficiency, stability and equity criteria. 
Their results concluded that punishment or rewards were 
useful incentives[3]. 
To improve the behavior of agents, reinforcement learning 
is one of the key means in multi-agent systems. reinforcement 
learning techniques recently proposed for transportation 
applications and they have demonstrated impressive results 
in game playing. Nallur et al. introduced the mechanism of 
algorithm diversity for nudging system to reach distributive 
justice in a decentralized manner.  They use minority game as 
an exemplar of an artificial transportation network and their 
result showed how algorithm diversity lead to faired reward 
distribution[19].  
 
The main goal of this study is to develop a model, based 
on the concept of minority games and reinforcement learning, 
to achieve equilibrium flow through public and private 
transportation. Minority game is applied to consider rewards, 
positive policy, for winner and learning is a tool to increase 
the user utility based on rewards. To illustrate, an artificial 
society of commuters are considered instantiated on a simple 
network with two modes of transportations, namely public 
(PT) and private (PR).  
The remaining parts are organized as follow. In Section II, 
the conceptual framework will be discussed and consists of a 
definition of user utility, minority game, and reinforcement 
learning algorithms. Illustration scenario of network and 
commuters and initial setup are explained in Section III. 
Experiments and results are shown in Section IV and related 
work are reviewed in Section Error! Reference source not 
found.. Conclusion of the hypothesis and results are drawn in 
SectionV. 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
In this section, the theoretical aspects and methodological 
ones are described, and also network design and model will be 
discussed.  
A. Traffic Simulation 
Traffic simulation models are classified into macroscopic 
and microscopic models. The hydrodynamic approach to 
model traffic flow is typical for macroscopic modeling. With 
this kind of approach, one can only make statements about the 
global qualities of traffic flow. For observing the behavior of 
an individual vehicle a microscopic simulation is necessary. 
Because traffic cannot be seen as a purely mechanical system, 
a microscopic traffic simulation should also take into 
consideration the capabilities of human drivers (e.g., 
perception, intention, driving attitudes, etc.)[2]. 
B. Network Design 
The network is formally represented as graph G (V, L) 
which V  is the set of nodes such as Origin, Destination, and 
middle nodes and L is the set of roads (edges or links) between 
nodes[3, 12]. Each line lk ϵ L has some properties such as 
mode, length, and capacity. In addition, the volume-delay 
function is used to describe the congestion effects 
macroscopically, that is, how the exceeding capacity of flow 
in a link affects the time and speed of travel, as below [13]: 
 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 =  𝑡𝑡0𝑘𝑘  [1 + 𝛼𝛼 (𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘⁄ )𝛽𝛽]      (1) 
where 𝑡𝑡0𝑘𝑘  is free flow travel time, 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘  is the number of 
vehicle and 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘  shows the capacity of the link k,  α and β are 
controlling parameters. 
C. Commuters Society  
Commuters, agents of the artificial society, have some 
attributes regarding travel preferences such as time (desired 
arrival time, desired travel time, mode of transportation, mode 
flexibility), cost (public transportation fare, waiting time cost, 
car cost if they have), socioeconomic features (income).  
They will learn and make a decision for their dairy plan 
based on their daily expectation and experience. The iteration 
module generates the demands of the transportation modes 
and desired time. Daily trips schedule for a given period of the 
day and define the set of origins and destinations with the 
respective desired departure and arrival times to and from each 
node. 
The utility-based approach is considered to evaluate travel 
experience and help agents make decisions. Total utility is 
computed as the sum of individual contribution as follow and 
is the combination based on previous researches [5, 12]: 
 Utotal=∑ Uperf, ini=1 + ∑ Utime, ini=1 + ∑ Ucost, ini=1    (2) 
where Utotal  is the total utility for a given plan; n is the 
number of activities, which equals the number of trips (the 
first and the last activity are counted as one); UPref,  i is the  
utility earned for performing activity i; Utime, i is the (negative) 
utility earned by the time such as travel time and waiting time 
for activity i; and Ucost,  i  is the (usually negative) utility 
earned for traveling during trip i. 
1) Performance Utility  
To measure the utility of selecting activity i, each mode of 
transportation has different variables. For public mode, 
comfort level and bus capacity, and for private, pollution and 
comfort level are considered. 
2) Time Utility 
The measurement of the travel time quantifies the 
commuter’s perception of time based on various components 
like waiting and in-vehicle traveling. Waiting time indicates 
the service frequency of public transportation. In-vehicle 
traveling time is an effective time to travel from origin to 
destination. 
3) Monetary Cost Utility 
Monetary cost can be defined as fare cost of public 
transportation, cost of fuel, tolls (if exists), car insurance, tax, 
and car maintenance. This kind of cost will be measured based 
on the income of commuters. 
Regard to three different utilities, the total utility of public 
and private can be measured as follow: 
 Uprivate
total =∑ UprivateiNi=1       (3) 
 Uprivate
i =�αtime* (ttt,expi /ttti  )�+�βPR * (cost_PR incomei⁄ ) �+ �αpollution *  ttti  *  pollution�+αcom_PR*�ttt,expi / ttti �     (4) 
 Upublic
total =∑ UpubliciNi=1       (5) 
 𝑈𝑈public𝑖𝑖 =�αtime*(ttt,expi /ttti  )�+ �βPT* (cost_PT incomei⁄ )�+ 
αcom_PT* �twt,expi / twti �+ �αcap* ttti  * capacity expi bus_capacity⁄ � (6) 
where  ttt
i   and  ttt,exp
i  are total travel time and expected total 
travel time of agent i, cost_PR is the monetary cost of private 
transportation (fuel, car maintenance and etc.), cost_PT, the 
fare of public transportation, incomei , the agent’s income per 
day, pollution is the amount of pollution is produced by private 
vehicles, capacity 
exp
i , and bus_capacity are expected capacity of 
the bus and the total capacity of each bus respectively, twt,exp
i  , 
expected waiting time and twt
i  is the waiting time by agent i. 
αtime, βPT, βPR, αpollution , αcom_PR, αcom_PT and αcap are considered as 
marginal utilities or preferences for different components. 
D. Minority Game 
The minority game, introduced by Challet and Zhang 
(1997)[14], consisting of N agents ( N is an odd number). They 
have to choose one of two sides independently and those on 
the minority side win. Winner agents get reward points, 
nothing for others. Each agent draws randomly one out of his 
S strategies and uses it to predict the next step. To choose what 
strategy to use each round, each is assigned a score based on 
how well it has performed so far, the one with the leading 
score is used at a time step. 
 It was originally developed as a model for financial 
markets, although it has been applied in different fields, like 
genetics and transportation problems[15]. While simple in its 
conception and implementation, it has been applied in various 
fields of transportation such as public transportation[16], route 
choosing[17], road user charging scheme[18]. It can be useful 
in traffic management which travelers try to find less crowded 
and congestion roads. 
E. Reinforcement Learning Method 
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a class of machine 
learning concerned with how agents ought to take actions in 
an environment so as to maximize cumulative reward [19]. 
Alvin Roth and Ido Erev developed a new algorithm, which is 
called “Roth-Erve”[20], to model how humans perform in 
competitive games against multiple strategic players. The 
algorithm specifies initial propensities (q0) for each of N 
actions and based on reward (rk) for action (ak) the 
propensities at the time (t+1) are defined as[20]: 
 q
j
(t + 1)= (1- φ) q
j
(t)+ Ej( ε, N, k, t)        (7) 
  Ej( ε, N, k, t)= � rk(t)[1-ε]                   if j=krk(t) ∗ (ε N-1⁄ )   otherwise       (8) 
Where φ  is recency as forgetting parameter and ε  is 
exploration parameter. The probability of choosing action j at 
time t is: 
  Pj(t)= 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)  ∑ �qn(t)�Nn=1⁄               (9) 
III. ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO  
In the simulation step, the perspective of the conceptual 
framework was considered a simple scenario where 
commuters make a decision over transportation mode and 
time during morning high-demand peak hour. Simulation 
model implemented through NetLogo [21] agent-based 
simulation environment. 
A. Network and Commuters  
In this study, two different links of two modes (PT or PR) 
consist of two middle nodes on each link. As it is shown in 
Fig. 1, to simplify the upper link is for private and the other 
for public transportation where each road is composed of one-
way links. 
Commuters, as type of agents, is defined by a number of 
state variables which are: (1) desired departure and arrival 
times, (2) experienced travel time, (3) the uncertainty they 
experienced during the trip with a given transportation mode, 
(4) a set of preferences about the transportation mode, (5) the 
perceived comfort as personal satisfaction for the mode 
choice, and (6) a daily income variable. While the agent 
experiences its travel activities, the costs associated with the 
different transportation mode, the perceived satisfaction of 
traveling (expressed in terms of travel times and comfort) and 
rewards earned by winners will have a certain impact on its 
mode and time choices.  
Commuters can choose between traveling by PT or PR 
modes based on own-car value. The decision-making process 
of each agent is assumed to maximize the utility and flow 
equilibrium on roads. They perceive current traffic condition 
as well as previous experience and use this information in 
making a decision. 
At the end of the travel each commuter stores the 
experienced travel time, costs, and crowding level (for PT 
mode users only) and emissions. These variables will be used 
to calculate the following day’s utility. After that each agent 
evaluates its own experience, comparing the expected utility 
to the effective utility. 
Based on minority game, we considered the number of 
commuters on each road and type of transportation and regard 
to Roth-Erve learning, the reward assigned to the winner who 
is in minority number and has the following criteria: 
1) Their obtained utility (Ueffective)  is greater than the 
utility prediction (Uexpected) as below:  
 Ueffective> α* Uexpected      (10) 
 𝛼𝛼 is marginal preference. 
2) The obtained utility of agent is higher than mean utility 
in the whole network : 
 Ueffective ≥ UN       where  UN= 1N  ∑ UeffectiveiNi=1     (11) 
Based on reward, effective utility they earned in their 
daily trip, car-ownership and mode-flexibility, each 
commuter decides about their new mode and time. 
 
B. Initial Setup 
As it is written in TABLE I, The capacity for all links was 
considered 150 and max capacity for each bus was 70 people. 
Population consist of 201 commuters was created, the odd 
number to coordinate with minority game, and they iterated 
their daily trips in 60 days. They were characterized by a 
number of attributes such as departure and arrival times, 
mode, daily income, car-ownership, and flexibility. Car-
ownership is a Boolean variable and indicates if the agent is a 
private or public transportation user. Flexibility reflects the 
willingness of a private mode user to change its mode. 
All agent’s plans were done in rush hours of the day from 
6:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m., with a normal distribution to simulate 
peak times. It was observed a high demand in peak duration 
between 8- 9:30 a.m., on both roads. The range of income was 
20 to 70 Euro per day. The routes between nodes Origin and 
Destination had both a length of 19 km. 
The free-flow travel time from node Origin to Destination 
was approximately 25 minutes in the PR mode and for the 
public transportation, around 35 minutes plus the waiting time 
at the bus stop and walking time. The bus frequency service 
was 10 minutes before the rush hour and 5 minutes during the 
rush hour. 
IV. RESULTS AND EXPERIMENTS 
We performed sixty iterations of the model, Roth-Erve 
learning was used to establish the equilibrium commuters 
between both roads along the departure time interval. During 
simulation steps, we monitored agents’ expected and effective 
utilities, average travel times of public and private 
transportation, average total travel times, number of 
commuters of each mode and differences between the average 
of total travel time in public and private transportation. 
 
TABLE I. DEFAULT VALUE OF NETWORK AND LEARNING PARAMETERS 
Variable Value 
Number of commuters N=201 
Capacity of links Li= 150 
Capacity of bus B=70 
Time 6:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. 
Range of income  20 to 70 € per day 
Simulation period 60 days 
Recency (φ) 0.3 
Exploration (ε) 0.6 
 
  The propensity of commuters to select public and private 
were set by normal distribution random and updated based on 
recency and exploration learning parameters. Earned scores 
and two propensities were observed during all days. 
In Fig. 2, the distribution of all commuters is depicted 
among all days, where green line and the red line show the 
number of agents on roads with public and private 
transportation respectively. The number of commuters on 
different modes of transportation converged by use of learning 
tools and rewards. In the first day, most of the people had a 
tendency to use public transportation, which was decreased in 
the last day of the simulation period. 
Total time of daily trips for both mode of transportation 
which was selected by agents, measured and the differences 
between these two times for all day long was calculated. In 
Fig. 3, the result is shown for the simulation period. This 
fluctuation was related to different factors such as traffic on 
road, departure time and waiting time for public transportation 
each day. However, in final days, the difference time between 
public and private transportation was less than 10 minutes by 
reaching equilibrium flow on transportation mode and, it 
seemed to be stable. 
Based on rewards and decision making of departure time 
and transportation mode, the commuters’ utilities were 
changed daily. Fig. 4 represents daily changes in effective 
utilities earned by each commuter among the whole period. In 
this chart, it is shown that both public and private utilities were 
increased with day-to-day variation.  
The number of commuters on different modes, effective 
utility, average time of public and private and average of total 
time which were observed at last day are described in TABLE 
II , and it shows the average of total travel time of each mode 
were roughly similar to the average of total travel time of both 
modes and effective utilities of commuters had a bit difference 
with ones they expected.  
 
Fig. 1. Network 
TABLE II. THE RESULT OF THE LAST DAY 
Variable Value 
No. of commuters on public transportation 102 
No. of commuters on public transportation 99 
Average  total time  on public transportation 34.26 min 
Average  total time  on private transportation 25.14 min 
Average  total time  of both mode 29.771 min 
Average effective utility on public transportation 15.502 
Average effective utility on private transportation 14.920 
Average expected utility on public transportation 15.710 
Average expected utility on private transportation 15.012 
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of commuters on roads 
 




Origin Destination  
PT 
PR 
 Fig. 4. Effective Utilities of Public and Private 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have proposed the framework for 
evaluating the reinforcement learning and effect of minority 
games on equilibrium flow on roads. We suggested applying 
agent-based modeling and simulation as a platform to 
implement our framework. 
To illustrate, a simple network consists of two different 
types of mode (PT and PR) were considered and a population 
of commuters with the memory of travel experiences was 
generated. They performed their daily plan in morning high-
demand hours and their activities iterated for sixty days. Their 
experience, expected and effective utilities, expected and 
effective travel time and rewards were observed and analyzed.  
In regard to results, the commuters learned to predict total 
travel time in both modes which their exception was similar to 
obtained total travel time in each mode. By balancing number 
of commuters on each type of transportation, they gained 
higher utilities rather than first days.  
From the illustrative example, the hypothesis of the study, 
which was to use RL and minority game to reach equilibrium 
flow, was reached and it is concluded that equilibrium flow 
can follow higher utilities and more precise time prediction in 
daily trips. 
For future work, we will consider a realistic large-scale 
network and demands, different types of incentives and roads 
with combination type of transportations so as to better study 
and analysis of commuters’ behavior and performance of the 
transportation system. With such improvements, we are 
confident that our framework can be proper and accurate to 
increase the commuters’ pleasant and also the performance of 
the road transportation system. 
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